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SIR,

No. 28.

Canal of Miserala, July 3, 1807.

I HAVE the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, that the advanced corps under my command, consisting of three companies of the 95th light battalion, 36th and 38th regiments, with two 3 and two 6-pounders, advanced from the position I had taken up in front of the village of Reduction; and, after making a considerable detour from the badness of the roads, I crossed the Chuello at the Chico Pass; from thence I continued my route, though very strongly enclosed, and difficult ground, till the head of the column arrived at the junction of two roads, about 500 yards from the Canal of Miserala. At the same moment that we discovered the enemy, they commenced a heavy, though, after the first round, not well-directed fire of shot and shells, my artillery having been left in the rear, under the protection of three companies of Brigadier-General Lumley's brigade, owing to the inability of the horses to bring it up at the same rate at which the infantry marched. I directed an immediate attack to be made on their left flank with the bayonet, which was executed by Brigadier-General Craufurd in the most perfect manner, with his brigade, and he was so well seconded by the gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Pack and Major Travers, the officers and men of the 95th, and light battalion, that in five minutes the enemy's force, though strongly posted behind hedges and embankments, gave way, leaving about 60 killed and 70 prisoners, with all their artillery, consisting of nine guns, one howitzer, three tumbrels with limbers complete.

I beg to state that the conduct of every officer and soldier engaged was admirable; and that I am also under great obligations to Brigadier-General Lumley, for his exertions to take a share in the action, but which alone the very exhausted state of his regiments, from the severity of the march, prevented. Immediately after I formed, I found that he had taken a good position on the right of the light brigade, to support it in case of re-attack..

I am happy to add our loss has been but trifling, not exceeding 14 rank and file killed, 5 officers, and 25 rank and file wounded. The exact returns I have not been able to obtain.

(Signed)

Lieut.-Colonel Torrens,

Military Secretary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. LEVISON GOWER,
Major-General.

Printed by S. Hamilton, Weybridge, Surry

APPENDIX II.

Letters, &c. read in the course of General Whitelocke's Defence.

Letter from Sir Samuel Achmuty to the Right Honourable William

Windham.

Monte Video, Feb. 7, 1807.

Sir, I have detailed the circumstances attending the capture of this place, but there are many points connected with it that require to be more particularly explained. The transports that brought us hither were such bad sailers that we were obliged to go into Rio Janeiro for water. I there learnt of the recapture of Buenos Ayres, and of our having possession of Maldonado. What force occupied it I could not learn from any good authority.

Under these circumstances, uncertain whether any impressions could be made on this coast, I requested Captain Donnelly of the Ardent, to complete the transports to four months' provision and water, if it could be effected at that place, for there was not a victualler with us; and I directed the Commissary to draw bills for a sum sufficient to advance part of the pay due to the troops. These services were performed at very favourable rates.

On my arrival at Maldonado, I found the troops there without artillery, without stores of any kind, with only a few days' provision, and without any prospect of procuring more, unless I detached a large force many miles in the country, exposed to the insults of a corps of 400 horse, that hovered round us to intercept supplies.

Our horse (we had 200 or 300 mounted) were unequal to pursue them, for the horses are not sufficiently strong to bear the weight of our equipments.

The enemy are armed with swords and muskets; they ride up, dismount, fire over the back of their horses, mount, and gallop off. All the inhabitants of this country are accustomed to this mode of warfare, and every inhabitant is an enemy.

Maldonado is an open town, and so situated that it cannot be made tenable with a small force. As it was of no consequence, in any point of view, I recommended its being evacuated, and the Admiral assented to the measure. Monte Video now appeared the only point I could with propriety assail, and I conceived my resources equal to the enterprise, but I found it a most arduous undertaking. I had not entrenching tools sufficient to make approaches; and, after a few days firing, the powder in all the fleet was reduced to 500 barrels, about four days' consumption. To add to my difficulties, 4000 picked troops, with 24 pieces of cannon, were rapidly approaching me. I determined

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to assault the place at all events, and happily succeeded, though with 3 heavy loss.

So immediately after the capture it is impossible to estimate justly the value of the conquest. It is strong, and amply supplied with artillery, and a great quantity of ammunition. We should want powder if the siege was greatly protracted. We also want artilleryınen. But how to provision the troops requires much deliberation. If the country is open, meat may be had is abundance, and cheap; but flour is very dear, and difficult to be obtained. Fuel is extremely scarce. rage there is none. Should the country be shut up from us, we must live upon salt provision. At all events, if it is determined to hold this place as apost, without further operations. Large supplies of powder, flour, spirits, and salt meat, should be immediately sent out.

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The capture of Buenos Ayres might make an alteration in the behaviour of the natives; but at present they are inveterately hostile. My force, after leaving a garrison in this place, would be unequal to the attempt; for though I should not fear meeting them in the field, they would soon harass me with their desultory attacks; nor could I keep in subjection an open town of 70,000 hostile inhabitants. In my opinion it will require a force of 15,000 men to conquer and keep this country.

I have but little time to make any arrangements within the town. The heads of all the offices are fled with their books and papers. The only measure I have yet adopted respecting the revenue is, to appoint a collector and comptroller of the customs, and a captain of the port. The duties directed by his Majesty will be punctually attended to; but with the approbation of the Admiral, I have determined, from the necessity of the case, to open the port for eight months, to neutrals bringing any article of food or liquor. How far I am justified in taking this measure on myself, I am ignorant; but I am convinced it is a necessary one; and his Majesty's order is founded on the supposition that the city and province of Buenos Ayres is in his possession.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your most obedient humble servant,
S. ACHMUTY.

The Right Hon. William Windham, &c. &c.

Letter from Sir Samuel Achmuty to the Right Honourable William

Sir,

Windham.

Monte Video, March 6, 1808.

When I last had the honour of addressing you, I had so lately gained possession of this fortress, and was so little acquainted with the country, that I could not presume to give more than a general opinion of the disposition of the inhabitants. I had every reason to believe they were, without exception, inimical to us. Previous to the surrender of Monte Video, I could place no confidence on any information I received; nor did any person superior to the lowest class come over to me. After its capture, a sullen silence pervaded every rank; and for some time the best informed among the principal citizens appeared ignorant of the most trifling occurrences.

The seizure of the viceroy by the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, an event certainly very important in itself, first gave me an insight into the views of many of the leading men, and convinced me that, however inimical they were to us, they were still more so to their present go

vernment.

The Marquis Sobramonte, viceroy of the province, had fled from Buenos Ayres, at its conquest by General Beresford. On the recapture, Signior Liniers, who commanded the troops on that occasion, was appointed governor of the city, and admittance was refused the Viceroy, who took up his residence at Monte Video. Previous to our investing it closely, he left it with a small corps, and a number of guns, and continued in its vicinity some time subsequent to the capture.

Immediately after the Leda was dispatched, I wrote to the Viceroy, demanding that our prisoners, taken at Buenos Ayres, should be delivered up, agreeably to the capitulation; and declaring that all the prisoners we had taken should, without exception, be sent to England, if the demand was not complied with. In reply, he acquainted me that he waited the orders of his sovereign before he could take any steps respecting his prisoners. This answer I communicated to the late Governor, and to the Cabildo, assuring them, that much as I regretted the necessity I was reduced to, I should certainly send away the prisoners.

I was now requested to write to the Cabildo at Buenos Ayres, and was informed that they alone could comply with my demand, as the Viceroy had no authority whatever, and the province was under their orders.

I now determined to send to Buenos Ayres, to demand the prisoners, and at the same time to offer terms to the inhabitants if they would surrender; but I waited until a force I had directed to advance into the country had begun its march. The intention of this corps was to oblige the Viceroy to fall farther back, to open the country, and to try how far it would be convenient to advance by land to Colonia. The Viceroy retreated on the first intimation of their approach, and fell in with a corps sent from Buenos Ayres to apprehend his person. He was conveyed a prisoner to that city.

To the reports of this capture were added others still more important; and I received them from so many quarters, that I could not avoid placing full reliance on them. It was added, that the Royal Court of Audienza was abolished, the king's authority set aside, and the Spanish colours no longer hoisted.

These reports were circulated with avidity, and I soon found that they were acceptable to the principal part of the inhabitants.

The persons who before appeared hostile and inveterate, now pressed me to advance a corps to Buenos Ayres; and assured me, if I would acknowledge their independence, and promise them the protection of the English Government, the place would submit to me.

Being fully determined to give no assurances whatever, but desirous to gain further and more positive information, I resolved to send an officer to Buenos Ayres. He was dispatched with a letter from the Admiral and myself to the Cabildo, claiming our prisoners, agreeably to the capitulation. It was also intimated, that we had heard they had refused obedience to the authority of the King of Spain; and as it was impossible they could have had time to arrange a form of governinent,

and consequently must be in a state of anarchy, we invited them to submit to his Britannic Majesty's authority, assuring them of the full benefit of their laws and religion, and security to their property. The vessel conveying these dispatches fell in with a boat, with General Beresford and Lieutenant-Colonel Pack on board, and returned immediately to Monte Video without delivering them.

The escape of General Beresford, an event as pleasing and important as it was unexpected, has put us in full possession of the views of the leading men, and the real state of the country. He had been ordered, immediately after the fall of Monte Video, to a town 300 leagues inland, and was already between 40 and 50 leagues from Buenos Ayres, when two Spanish officers, in the family of the Governor, who had been endeavouring to enter into some political negociation with him, proposed to assist and accompany him in making his escape, which, with great difficulty, was effected; and the General, after being three successive days secreted in Buenos Ayres, fortunately reached the ship with our dispatches.

From the General I was made acquainted, that the report of the suppression of the Court of Audienza, and the revolt from the Spanish authority, was unfounded. The forms of the ancient government were till adhered to, and the Court of Audienza, as next in authority to the Viceroy, assumed his power, but the city was a prey to every disorder and tumult.

The letter to the Cabildo was in consequence withdrawn, and one addressed to the Viceroy, or officers possessing the supreme authority, was substituted in its place.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of it, and of the answers received from Bueños Ayres.

From these answers it may be supposed that the leading people are unanimous in their determination to defend the place and keep their prisoners. But it appears that there are two parties in that city.

The party now in power are mostly natives of Spain, in the principal offices of church and state, and devoted to the Spanish Government. It has been their policy to inflame the minds of the lower order against the English, by every species of exaggeration and falsehood, and to lead them to such acts of atrocity, as may preclude the possibility of any communication with us.

From a consciousness that, similarly situated, they would breathe nothing but revenge, they expect no mercy, and are become desperate and determined.

The second party consists of natives of the country, with some Spaniards that are settled in it. The oppression of the mother country has made them most anxious to shake off the Spanish yoke; and though, from their ignorance, their want of morals, and the barbarity of their disposition, they are totally unfitted to govern themselves; they aim at following the steps of the North Americans, and erecting an independent state. If we would promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against the Government, and join us with the great mass of the inhabitants. But though nothing less than independence will perfectly satisfy them, they would prefer our Government, either to their present anarchy, or to the Spanish yoke, provided we would promise not to

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