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The Federalist: On the New Constitution, Written in 1788
Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay
Affichage du livre entier - 1842
The Federalist, on the New Constitution: Written in 1788
Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay
Affichage du livre entier - 1818
admit advantage America appear appointment army articles of confederation authority bill of rights body branch Britain cern circumstances citizens commerce common confederacy confederation congress Connecticut consideration considered convention council courts danger defence degree duties effect elections equal ernment established executive exercise existing experience extent faction favour federacies federal government foreign former HAMILTON house of representatives impeachments important influence instance interests jealousy judges judiciary department jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislative legislature less liberty Macedon magistrate means ment merated militia monarch Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity objects observations officers particular parties passions peace Pennsylvania persons political possess president principle probably proper proportion proposed constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect revenue senate Sparta stadtholder subject continued supposed supreme taxation taxes tion tive treaties trial by jury union United usurpation
Page 50 - By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community...
Page 269 - If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Page 253 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 388 - The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must...
Page 51 - So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Page 50 - The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.
Page 388 - Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice ; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Page 51 - No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens ? And what are the different classes of...
Page 12 - Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people— a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs...
Page 236 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace ; enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.